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Abstract
In this article I discuss whether the human activity of text summarisation can be
successfully simulated in a computer. In order to write a computer program that
produces high-quality summaries it becomes necessary to specify the cognitive pro-
cesses involved when humans summarise text. As texts can be summarised in many
different ways, evaluation of summaries becomes an important aspect in the discussion.
The article discusses relevant factors in such an evaluation process. It turns out that
humans when summarising texts make use of knowledge which is not readily open to
scrutiny; it is tacit knowledge. This makes it very difficult to produce computer-
generated summaries which are as good as those produced by skilled humans. New
developments within artificial intelligence, relying on network processing techniques,
may offer solutions to the problem of dealing with tacit knowledge. At present, accept-
able computer summaries may be generated by programs combining accessible human
knowledge of the summarisation process and knowledge about text.
1. Background
The emergence of the Internet as a commonly available information
distribution channel in the 1990s intensified research efforts to develop
automatic text condensation programs, as the wealth of electronically
available documents made information overload an imminent danger.
Automatic text condensation, like machine translation, involves the
processing of natural language in a computer. In order to get the com-
puter to perform tasks traditionally performed by human beings, pro-
grammers must be able to describe the human activity in a way the
computer ‘understands’ and can imitate. Research groups working on
such issues are usually found in academic departments and commercial
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enterprises dedicated to the field of artificial intelligence (AI). Work
involving automatic text condensation, or text summarisation as it is
generally known, goes back to the early days of the computer, with
Luhn’s (1958) study as one of the very first attempts. Efforts to make
the computer emulate the human cognitive processes involved in text
summarisation soon revealed, however, that the formulation of such
rules for simulating human behaviour in this very complex task is at
best difficult. Today, four decades after the development of the first
automatic summarisers, no automatic summarising program exists that
can claim a high degree of success in condensing full texts from all
domains to summary form. In the following, I will discuss whether it
will ever be possible to write a computer program that matches a skilled
human being’s performance in text summarisation.
2. Introduction 
Almost every day most of us will have to practise the skill of summar-
ising something for other people. The full ‘story’ may be in the form of
an event experienced, a film seen, a meeting attended, a text read, etc.
Some people are good at presenting just the salient facts, while others
get bogged down by irrelevant details and detours. The skill of sum-
marising is a skill that increases with maturity and training, so that
young children show poorer performance than older ones, and novice
students are surpassed by mature ones (cf. e.g. Brown and Day 1983).
With the development of new publishing media like the World Wide
Web, access to new information has become greatly simplified com-
pared to just a decade ago. Researchers can easily take advantage of
each other’s findings, as new results are made available almost imme-
diately upon discovery. This situation has, however, created a new
problem, namely how to handle all the information and how to decide
its relevance. The problem of information overload has, as already stat-
ed, attracted research interest from people working within the field of
artificial intelligence. Numerous research groups around the world have
developed software programs that condense full text to summary form.
These programs display varying degrees of success with regard to their
ability to find and present the most salient information expressed in the
full text. However, no current computer program can claim to match a
skilled human’s ability to condense text. 
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In order to get a computer to perform a task, very specific instruc-
tions are needed. The task must to be broken down into many separate
operations. Each of these operations must be described in such a
concrete way as to be implementable in a computer program. One of the
problems of human text summarisation is that there is no one generally
accepted way of condensing a text. Experiments have shown that a
group of people given a text to summarise will agree on some of the
information to be included in a condensed version, but certainly not all
(Salton et al. 1997). Nor are there universally accepted criteria for
evaluating different summaries of a text (Gibson 1993, Jing et al. 1998,
Dahl forthcoming (a)).  
In this article I discuss whether the problems software engineers
have with writing text summarisation programs matching human per-
formance can be explained by reference to tacit knowledge. This con-
cept is first and foremost associated with the Hungarian scientist and
philosopher Michael Polanyi (1958/1962, 1967), but it has been taken
up by other philosophers and given different interpretations according
to their general theoretical positions. The term tacit knowledge has
today gained currency in a number of other domains, notably know-
ledge management and pedagogy. Perhaps as a consequence of being
used within different fields, the concept behind the term escapes easy
definition. At times tacit knowledge is used about knowledge that can
never be articulated, but must remain tacit. This may be called ‘inartic-
ulate knowledge’. At other times the term represents knowledge which
has become internalised through formal training and practice. Such
knowledge can be verbalised and made part of conscious reasoning
again. It is, so to speak, returned to the category of explicit knowledge.
I also see a third phenomenon that can be covered by the term tacit
knowledge. The use of the computer to emulate human behaviour has
led to a sharper focus on how humans actually do things. In order to
formulate rules for human behaviour, some aspects of a process that
may previously only have existed as tacit knowledge can be verbalised
and moved from the subconscious to the conscious level. This kind of
knowledge may be called ‘unarticulated knowledge’, alluding to the
potential for verbalisation.
The fact that some kinds of tacit knowledge must remain tacit has
implications for automatic text summarisation. It is very likely that fu-
ture computer programs may yield higher quality output than today’s
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programs, by for instance verbalising some previously tacit knowledge
(habits and unarticulated knowledge), but since some knowledge can-
not be conscious (since it is inarticulate knowledge), it seems unlikely
that a computer will ever be able to match high-quality human perform-
ance in text summarisation. 
3. The concept of Knowledge
The invention of the computer in the 1940s led to a revival of the view
within philosophy of human beings as machines. Such a view implies
that human behaviour is seen as rule-based and may be transferred to a
computer which is then able to mimic this behaviour. This view is
known as the computational view of the mind. According to such a
view, what counts as progress within artificial intelligence boils down
to putting more – rule-based – knowledge into the machine. Early
success in computer programming gave nourishment to this line of
reasoning. As machine power increased in the 1970s, expert systems
were developed that seemed to work just as well as, or sometimes even
better than, human experts (Feigenbaum 1984). Such programs are
dedicated to solving problems and giving advice within a specialised
area of knowledge, a micro-world. The systems are developed by elicit-
ing expert knowledge from a group of outstanding practitioners in the
relevant domain. This knowledge is then formulated as rules. One
program that can claim to be successful in the sense that its decisions
were judged to equal that of a human expert is MYCIN. The program,
which was developed at Stanford University, is an interactive system
that assists physicians in diagnosing infectious diseases such as menin-
gitis. Another successful program is LOKE (Sørensen and Nordhus
1988). This system was developed by engineers and knowledge experts
at Statoil, the Norwegian state-owned oil company. LOKE was con-
structed to assist the drilling supervisor in the drill bit selection process. 
However, other areas of human behaviour turned out to be far less
amenable to computerisation. Efforts to formulate rules for tasks in-
volving natural language processing yielded very disappointing results.
The proponents of the computational model of the mind claim that set-
backs in these fields are temporary only, and that once we are able to
formulate the knowledge that is ‘hidden’ from inspection today, there is
no reason to believe that computers will not be able to match the per-
formance of humans in natural language processing in the future.
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Opponents of the idea of equating humans with machines, such as the
American professor of philosophy Hubert Dreyfus (1979, 1992) and
John Searle (1980), maintain that the problem is a much more funda-
mental one. To represent all of human knowledge as a mere symbol
manipulation system gives an insufficient account of human under-
standing. Support for this position can also be found in the account
given by one of the developers of the LOKE expert system. In the
knowledge elicitation phase, the programmers became frustrated when
the domain experts were unable to give precise answers to questions
about their own selection criteria. One of the participants in the project
states the following:
Som i andre prosjekt fikk vi en del problem under veis (sic). Et hoved-
problem var at mange av de svarene vi fikk ikke var noen skikkelige
svar. De inneholdt liksom ikke kunnskap i vår forstand av ordet.
Man måtte vel kunne si noe mer fornuftig om hvorfor boringen går
greitt enn at man merker det på ristingen i riggen? (Sørensen n.d.,
emphasis added)
What is knowledge, then? When we think about knowledge we tend to
focus on what goes on at the conscious level. Especially in a situation
of formal training, we emphasise the transfer and reproduction of facts
and beliefs. This is particularly pertinent to academic educations, but
also to some extent to apprenticeships in various crafts. The apprentice,
in addition, clearly needs to pick up skills that will be more difficult to
pin down as actual knowledge. The same, in fact, applies to academic
settings. Knowledge about genre and register in academic writing may
be subconscious, as may our way of arguing a point in a piece of re-
search. To me it seems obvious that knowledge is not only something
that can be acquired through a book or a lecture. We are socialised into
research communities through training at the conscious as well as the
subconscious level. The British sociologist H.M. Collins puts it this
way: ‘The general rule is that we know more than we can say, and that
we come to know more than we can say because we learn by being
socialized, not by being instructed.’ (Collins 1990: 7-8). 
This idea of ‘knowing more than we can say’ can be linked to the
view of knowledge developed by Polanyi (1958/1962, 1967). Polanyi
sees a tacit dimension to knowledge. The knowledge that is open to
scrutiny – often referred to by terms like propositional knowledge or
explicit knowledge – rests upon this tacit knowledge. If we support this
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view that knowledge is something more than explicit facts and beliefs
that can be formulated verbally, this will have implications for our view
of artificial intelligence. How can a machine ever come close to intelli-
gent behaviour if much of human knowledge turns out to be impossible
to verbalise? Traditional artificial intelligence literature tends to dis-
agree with these ideas (for another view within AI, see the discussion of
connectionism in section 4). In programming involving natural lan-
guage processing (notably machine translation and text summarisa-
tion), the limitations of most systems are usually ascribed to deficien-
cies in the knowledge base that the program draws on, or linguistic
problems like word ambiguity and anaphora resolution. Success prog-
rams involving manipulation of natural language tend to apply to very
restricted areas. A case in point is the Canadian TAUM METEO pro-
gram that translates weather forecasts between English and French.
Another program, which is still being refined, is a communications sys-
tem for use in the Channel Tunnel. The program, called PoliceSpeak, is
a bilingual text messaging system. It allows French and British Police
to exchange operational text messages in their own languages. In a
comment on the eventual success of the system, one of the developers,
Edward Johnson, says the following:
The success of strategies like PoliceSpeak depends ultimately on the
abilities of the service professionals themselves and considerable
mental discipline is required of them. They need to tolerate the tension
between their explicit operational language and their everyday lan-
guage in which communicative power seems to lie not so much in
exactness but in fuzziness of expression and tolerance of ambiguity; in
which very little has universal hard and fast ‘currency’ and through
which feelings and information are exchanged by way of a mysterious
process of linguistic negotiation during which things are said which
are not meant; things are successfully conveyed which have not been
adequately articulated and things agreed which have never been
stated. (Johnson 1994: 745)
The last part of the quote again points to the problem raised in this arti-
cle: Is it possible to capture all aspects of human behaviour and for-
malise them for use in a computer? 
Knowledge presupposes intelligence. In the next section I will dis-
cuss this concept in relation to human beings as well as computers.
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4. Intelligence in humans and machines
An attempt to define intelligence can never be more than an attempt.
We cannot hope to grasp all the aspects of such a complex notion. A
definition of intelligence should include the capacity to learn. In order
to learn, human beings exploit their ability to see, use language and
motor facilities. These facilities combine in the use of knowledge, both
common-sense and domain-specific, to acquire new knowledge. An-
other very basic aspect of human intelligence is creativity. Both the ca-
pacity to learn and the aspect of creativity must be included in our defi-
nition of what it means to be a human being. Until people used both
their capacity to learn and their creativity to invent the computer in the
early 1940s, the study of intelligence was a field dominated by philos-
ophers and psychologists. The computer changed this and spawned a
brand new field of research activity, termed artificial intelligence (AI).
The phrase was coined by John McCarthy at the famous Dartmouth
Conference in New Hampshire in 1956, which is considered as the birth
of the discipline. The research field today encompasses disciplines such
as computer science, cognitive science, linguistics, psychology and phi-
losophy.
To many people the term artificial intelligence is an oxymoron. They
maintain that only humans can display intelligence. The term is never-
theless defined as the science of designing machines and systems which
do things that would require intelligence if done by people. Within the
domain of artificial intelligence we distinguish between the strong AI
and the weak AI programme. Proponents of strong AI think that we will
eventually be able to produce real intelligence in a machine. This im-
plies that we can create a machine that will be a thinking entity, a con-
scious being. Those who support the weak AI programme think that the
creation of truly intelligent machines is an unrealistic goal, and go for
the more modest aim of producing very good emulations of intelligent
behaviour. 
In order to get the computer to emulate human behaviour it becomes
necessary to find out about the workings of the brain. The human brain
has been studied from many different angles and today we know much
about the way neurons and neurotransmitters operate. But when we try
to copy the workings of this so-called ‘wetware’ and transfer it to com-
puter hardware, it becomes abundantly clear that much about the brain
remains a mystery. One important finding in this respect is that a piece
119
of knowledge does not seem to be related to one specific location in the
brain; rather, a combination of different locations is involved. The phi-
losopher Jack Copeland, in a comparison between human and machine
memory, states that ‘[e]ach piece of information in a computer’s mem-
ory has a single address or ‘handle’. In contrast, the human brain is ca-
pable of using any one of an open-ended collection of descriptions to
retrieve one and the same fact.’ (Copeland 1993: 188). 
As already mentioned, the mimicking of human activity has been
successful in some areas, while in other fields the researchers are left
disillusioned about the computer’s abilities, or rather people’s ability to
formulate the necessary requirements for a program to perform tasks to
the same high quality as human beings. One of the most active propo-
nents of the strong AI programme, Douglas B. Lenat, states the dilem-
ma of AI in the following way: ‘One of the most frustrating lessons
computers have taught us time and time again is that many of the ac-
tions we think of as difficult are easy to automate – and vice versa.’
(Lenat 1995). To Hubert Dreyfus (1992) this is proof that traditional AI
is a degenerating research programme. We have a situation with a
scientific enterprise starting out with great success in a limited domain.
Attempts to apply the approach more broadly, however, are less suc-
cessful. Important phenomena cannot be handled by the techniques
stipulated, and the research programme will eventually be abandoned.
This, according to Dreyfus, sums up the current situation within tradi-
tional artificial intelligence. 
However, recent developments within the branch of artificial intelli-
gence research known as connectionism have generated new optimism
with regard to the potential for emulating human behaviour. While tra-
ditional AI research focuses on how a single computer can be program-
med to perform symbol processing, the connectionist approach in-
volves the use of a network of processing devices, meant to imitate the
workings of the human brain. This approach operates under various
names, such as connectionism (cf. e.g. Churchland and Sejnowski
1992), parallel distributed processing (PDP) (cf. e.g. Rumelhart and
McClelland 1986) and artificial neural networks (relevant research
information can be found at http://www.ewh.ieee.org/tc/nnc/research).
The terms are associated with different research environments and
display some theoretical differences, but the many common features
justify a common treatment in the present context. As the term connec-
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tionist seems to be the most general term, it will be used in the follow-
ing. The connectionist approach relies on the interconnection of several
simple processing units in order to produce the kind of complex
behaviour associated with the human brain. Thus, rather than approach-
ing concepts and actions in terms of mere symbol processing expressed
in algorithmic form, connectionist approaches are inspired by the work-
ings of the brain. This implies that in a connectionist system there are
connections between several processing units. These connections can
be modified (strengthened or weakened) in order to accommodate new
information. In most cases such systems include a learning procedure.
The system can be trained on empirical data of the behaviour we are
trying to emulate. In the training process, structures from the existing
data can be picked out and exploited to modify the connections between
the processing elements. The system is hence capable of learning pat-
terns from examples. Much research effort is currently invested in pro-
jects taking a connectionist approach to computing. Such systems have
seen encouraging progress in areas involving e.g. sensory data, includ-
ing speech recognition. Another area involving language is signature
analysis, where handwriting recognition can be obtained through con-
nectionist systems. Other areas of application include the health care
industry, the financial industry and manufacturing.
To my knowledge, little if any connectionist-inspired research to
date has involved the natural language processing activity of text sum-
marisation. Hence, the discussion of this task in the next section focuses
on results obtained in projects taking more traditional AI approaches to
text summarisation.
5. Text summarisation
A very simple definition of what the product of a text summarisation
process is could be put as follows: a shortened version of a source (orig-
inal) text, containing the main content of that text. Several terms are in
use for such a derived text, such as summary, abstract and extract.
Summary and abstract are often used as synonyms for a derived text
based on a source text, while an extract is a derived text consisting of
fragments of the source text (cf. Dahl forthcoming (b) for a more thor-
ough discussion of the three terms). In human text summarisation two
different situations occur depending on who is doing the summarising.
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One common situation is the one where the summariser is not the
author of the source text. This is the case in pedagogical summarising
activity and in the abstracting and indexing services. The cognitive
process first called into action in such cases is source text comprehen-
sion. This aspect is of course particularly relevant with texts from spe-
cial knowledge domains. Another important – and interdependent –
skill is the summarising skill itself, involving the picking out of relevant
content for inclusion in the summary as well as the condensation aspect,
turning local information into globally relevant material. Finally, lin-
guistic ability is needed to present the information in a readable form.
Another situation presents itself when the author of the source text is
summarising his or her own text. In that case the comprehension phase
is irrelevant, but the other two still apply.
In automating this process the computer must be likened to a second-
ary abstractor (that is, someone other than the author of the source text),
bringing the comprehension phase to the fore. How can we make the
machine ‘understand’ the source text? Obviously an extremely compre-
hensive knowledge base is required if the summariser is meant for non-
restricted use. This brings us to the common-sense knowledge problem
in artificial intelligence. Even young children know a lot of things about
the world which the digital computer is ignorant of until the knowledge
has been explicitly stated. If a child is told that mummy is in
Copenhagen, the child also knows that mummy’s arms are in Copen-
hagen. A computer, when asked about this, is not able to infer the cor-
rect answer unless it has been specified in the program. In order to ad-
dress this very serious problem of lack of common-sense knowledge,
Douglas B. Lenat in 1984 initiated a large-scale project, called CYC
(http://www.cyc.com/), aiming to develop a large computational data-
base and search tools which will enable artificial intelligence systems to
access the knowledge making up common sense (Lenat 1995). The
approach used to gather this common sense information is to capture all
the knowledge – both implicit and explicit—in a hundred randomly
selected articles in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. The CYC project can
be regarded as a start in the right direction when it comes to common
sense knowledge. In addition, large amounts of domain-specific know-
ledge will be needed for many texts. The nontrivial nature of this task is
obvious. 
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The comprehension problems caused by the lack of common-sense
as well as domain-specific knowledge represent the first major problem
in automatic text summarisation. Taking such a deep approach to text
condensation implies not only generating a full semantic representation
of the source text. In a next, perhaps equally difficult, step explicit rules
for how the essential information can be selected from the source text
must be formulated. Then, a semantic representation of the new, con-
densed, version, must be generated before this version is given a final,
textual, form (cf. e.g. Sparck Jones 1997). To date no automatic sum-
mariser drawing on a knowledge base has been developed that can
handle unrestricted text. A few examples exist for very limited domains
like, for instance, the summarisation of banking telexes (Young and
Hayes 1985).
Any problems the summarising program has in the comprehension
phase will be carried over into the actual summarisation phase. How
can the program find the essential information when global understand-
ing of the source is missing? In order break this deadlock, some AI re-
searchers have teamed up with text linguists to skim as much as pos-
sible from the surface of the source text. Textual factors that can be ex-
ploited in such an approach are, for instance, overt rhetorical structure
indicators like section headings in research articles and the lead in
newspaper articles, or indicator phrases in articles such as ‘The princi-
pal aim of this paper is to investigate…’, ‘This paper reports the results
of an experiment…’, and ‘It has been shown that…’ (Paice 1981). An-
other approach has been to use significant lexical cohesion between
sentences to trace the essential information in a text. The lexical co-
hesion method has yielded quite promising results (Hoey 1991,
Benbrahim 1996, Barzilay /Elhadad 1997). Current research projects
on automatic text summarisation (e.g. Teufel /Moens 1998, Dahl forth-
coming (b)) suggest that a combination of such methods might be a way
forward towards better summaries.
A common characteristic of such shallow (as opposed to the deep)
automatic summarisers using textual information is that the output text
is an extract rather than an abstract. What the programs do is lift sen-
tences from the source text and present them in concatenated form as a
summary. Hence, in contrast to abstract writing, no synthesis of infor-
mation takes place. A problem with this approach is the potential lack
of coherence in the summary since local coherence may be lost in the
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extraction process (this is usually clearly demonstrated in the use of
Microsoft’s Word 98 AutoSummarize facility).
The followers of the strong AI programme reject this idea of surface
text-based summarisers, and keep their focus on developing more pow-
erful knowledge bases and the formulation of rules to account for sum-
marisation behaviour. However, they recognise that the development of
automatic summarisers based on deep approaches to the task is a long-
term goal (Sparck Jones 1999). 
6. Evaluation of summaries
As indicated in the introduction, the field of automatic text summar-
isation is an active one, and particularly the surface-text based pro-
grams may claim some success. This brings us to the thorny question of
evaluation. A common conclusion to many research projects in text
condensation is that there is surprisingly little agreement among a
group of human summarisers of how a full text can be condensed
(Salton et al. 1997). The same applies to the assessment of summaries
by a group of people (Gibson 1993). These two situations both reflect
the most essential aspects of text summarisation: The first concerns the
process of condensing a text; the second concerns the product, the sum-
mary itself. The process aspect is reflected in the following question: If
we are to mimic human behaviour in the automatic summarisation pro-
cess, what kind of human behaviour should we use as our model? As
regards the product aspect, the following question must be asked: How
can we measure the success of each program’s output and say that one
program works better than another? In the following discussion of
relevant criteria in the evaluation of summaries, the process and prod-
uct aspects are both important. It is not obvious how they can be kept
separate. A description of mimic-worthy summarisation behaviour
seems almost inextricably linked to our evaluation of the summary pro-
duced. In both instances some of the factors involved remain impos-
sible to express in words; they operate at the tacit level of knowledge.
We might start by setting up two broad categories of evaluation cri-
teria: they may be quantitative or qualitative criteria. A purely quan-
titative criterion is the time it takes to produce a summary from a source
text. Today production time for automatic summarisers ranges from
several hours to a few seconds. This is obviously important in a com-
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mercial context. The length of a summary (can it be easily customised
to the requirements of the user of the summary?) is another quantitative
criterion which can be imposed in an evaluation procedure.
As for qualitative criteria, one method of evaluation could be to for-
mulate some kind of norm that the summary could be measured against.
For certain types of text there are such norms in the form of officially
recognised standards. A case in point is the ISO 214-1976 (E) standard
for writing abstracts. Abstracts of journal articles within the natural
sciences tend to follow this standard quite closely, while abstracts of
research articles within the humanities are much less standardised
(Tibbo 1992). If we accept a standard like the ISO 214 as a valid and
relevant one – and this of course is the point about having agreed stan-
dards – evaluation of a summary of a research article can be done by
measuring how the derived text matches the recommendations stated in
the standard. At some high level of evaluation this is useful. The ISO
standard defines an abstract as ‘an abbreviated, accurate representation
of the contents of a document, without added interpretation or criti-
cism’. It recommends that the abstract ‘states the purpose, methodol-
ogy, results, and conclusions presented in the original document’.
Using this norm, it might be possible to point to a missing concept/idea
in a summary, or indicate criticism included, and evaluate it as flawed.
Measuring against such a general norm can, however, only take us part
of the way. There will be many cases where the norm has been follow-
ed, but still human evaluation of different summaries of a source text
will vary. This is demonstrated in studies by for instance Gibson (1993)
and Salton et al. (1997). Gibson (1993) states that:
it seems reasonable to conclude that the success of an abstract is deter-
mined not by any one single factor, but by a complex set of factors.
Further, it seems reasonable to conclude that informants [=evaluators.
My note] either do not agree on the composition of these factors, or
that they choose to attach differing levels of importance to each.
(Gibson 1993:122)
Human evaluation is regarded as the most powerful qualitative evalu-
ation criterion today, but as we have seen, also the most elusive.
The measures available for evaluation that I have touched upon so
far, that is production time, length, benchmarking against a standard
and human preference, were all presented without any reference to con-
textual factors. The most influential contextual factors are audience and
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use. A human summariser must take readership into account when
producing a derived version of a source text. This is particularly
relevant in the communication of specialist knowledge. In symmetrical
communication situations, where the readership of the source text and
the summary share the same knowledge base, no special adaptation
strategies are needed in the summary production phase. In asymmetri-
cal situations, like for instance popularised accounts, much effort must
be put into converting the source text content into a suitable form in the
summary. A special adaptation phase is introduced in the summar-
isation process. Adaptation can take place at various levels. Explicita-
tion of content to replace inferences may be a relevant strategy, as may
replacement of special terminology with general language words.
The second contextual factor – use – requires the summariser to pay
attention to what the summary is meant for. Relevant categories of
summary use are: as a replacement of the source text, as a relevance
indicator for the source text or as a content pre-organiser of the source
text. 
So, is it relevant to apply such evaluation criteria to an automatic
summariser, and can we expect it to handle any of the contextual fac-
tors? The quantitative criteria, such as production time and length, have
been shown to be relevant. As for the qualitative criteria, it should be
feasible to write a program that adheres to the standard for writing
abstracts by including information from all the parts of e.g. a research
article. The problem of how to pick the most relevant information from
each part remains, however. 
As for adaptation to audience and use, to my knowledge none of the
existing computer programs may claim to accommodate such para-
meters. What we are left with is that indefinable notion of human indi-
vidual judgement. This is not unique to the production of summaries. It
is a general issue related to text production and evaluation, as for in-
stance Hertzberg (1995) has shown. We meet it in the production of all
kinds of texts from novels to technical reports. We also meet it in de-
rived texts like translations, text adaptations and summaries. The fact
that text production in general and text summarisation in particular is so
difficult to explain and evaluate implies that the cognitive processes
involved are so complex that it does not make sense to try to explain
them by reference to linguistic phenomena alone.
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There have been attempts at finding out what mental processes are
involved in human text summarisation, with the aim to implement those
aspects in a computer program. One such project taking a psychological
approach is that of Endres-Niggemeyer et al. (1995). The method they
employ in discovering the processes involved is thinking-aloud proto-
col. The human summariser tape-records what he or she is doing during
the summarisation process and why. The intention is to capture the
routine working processes involved in this task. Endres-Niggemeyer et
al. (1995) remark that :
[n]atural working steps demonstrate intact and competent human
behaviour. An important part of human know-how lies in the skil-
led combination of different strategies. Only in working steps can
we observe how successful abstracting acts are performed and how
several pieces of know-how are integrated to achieve a cognitive aim.
(Endres-Niggemeyer et al. 1995: 636, emphasis added)
As is the case with many such projects, no computer implementation
has taken place yet. In addition, only four working steps are worked
out, aimed at producing a topic sentence for the summary. There is quite
a way to go from this rather modest start to the production of a complete
summary.
7. The indefinable: tacit knowledge
The definition of artificial intelligence implies that its research domain
is the emulation of human behaviour. When it comes to tasks like text
summarisation, the lack of adequate common-sense knowledge bases
has led to research effort being channelled into text extraction, drawing
on textual knowledge, rather than the pursuit of ‘real’ text summari-
sation with synthesis of content and coherent summary output. The
attempts that have been made at writing such text-based programs have
managed to capture some of the features that humans probably make
use of. Research on writer – reader interaction (e.g. Hoey 1991, Myers
1992) shows that we are alerted to important points in a text through the
use of indicator phrases and repetition of terminology and phraseology,
that is, lexical cohesion. The existence of standards like the ISO 214 has
also had a strong normative effect, at least within the natural sciences. 
But even if very powerful common-sense and domain-specific
knowledge bases were to be developed, this would still not be suf-
ficient. The researchers within the AI domain – particularly the adher-
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ents of the strong programme – see human beings as machines. Any dif-
ficulty in formulating the rules for required output is temporary only. If
we disagree with this view of humans and support the ideas of Dreyfus
(1972, 1992) and Searle (1980) that we are much more complex enti-
ties, we cannot hope to write computer programs that attain the level of
performance of skilled humans in all tasks. Natural language process-
ing may well turn out to be such an ‘impossible’ task. 
The consequence of regarding humans and machines as different
sorts of entities is not necessarily that we should abandon the computer
in all natural language matters. On the contrary, by continuing the effort
of writing better programs to manipulate natural language, we learn
much about the human activity involved. This way human performance
improves at the same time through conscious focusing on the processes
involved. Some of the aspects involved in natural language processing
clearly belong to the area of tacit knowledge. We recognise this through
the quotes from Johnson (1994), Gibson (1993) and also, in fact,
Endres-Niggemeyer et al. (1995). These quotes effectively imply that
how we produce a text and how we evaluate it depend on factors which
are not readily open to scrutiny. Some of these factors may in future be
verbalised and hence transferred to the category of explicit knowledge.
Such knowledge can be assigned to the category of currently unarticu-
lated knowledge. In the conclusion to their paper, Endres-Niggemeyer
et al. (1995) allude to such a situation. The empirical model used in
their study is said to uncover ‘features of the intellectual process which
had not been specified earlier’ (1995: 671-672, emphasis added). We
will, however, be left with aspects which can only be described by
phrases like ‘Text 1 reads better than text 2’, ‘This version is more lucid
than that one’, ‘This is a better summary of text A than that one’, etc.
What is actually implied in such evaluative expressions remains hidden
in the interface between the human being uttering them and the socio-
cultural context this person exists in. Such knowledge remains tacit; it
is inarticulate knowledge. As for the branch of artificial intelligence re-
search involving connectionist approaches to the computation of hu-
man activities, this may be a way forward. The Canadian philosopher
Paul Thagard, for one, points to connectionism as a potential way to
handle even the tacit – inarticulate – component of knowledge. Speak-
ing against what he sees as the excessive optimism of proponents of the
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symbol-processing approach, he expresses his own views on the future
of AI in the following quote:
My own guess is that we are still missing a number of key conceptual
ingredients for understanding natural and artificial intelligence, so I
would project centuries of research rather than decades. It is also pos-
sible that the problem of understanding the mind is too complex for
the mind to solve, or that the computational approach is fundamental-
ly flawed, perhaps because thought is ineluctably tacit or situated in
the world. But AI has at least the possibility of modeling tacit know-
ledge (through connectionist distributed representations or cases used
analogically) and of situating cognition in the world (through distri-
buted AI and robotics). Progress has been sufficient in the past few
decades that the only reasonable collective scientific strategy is to wait
and see how the ideas play themselves out. (Thagard 1993)
Predictions about the future are notoriously hard to confute. In my
opinion, however, humans and computers are different entities and will
remain so, even as new and more sophisticated machines and networks
are developed. 
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